The Latin Mass Society is sponsoring a book launch in London for Fr Serafino Lanzetta's book: 20th July, from 6:30pm, in the basement of St Mary Moorfields, Eldon Street, London, concluding with Vespers at 8pm with the Schola Gregoriana of Cambridge.
It is open to all and free, but since we are providing refreshments please let us know you are coming: email info@lms.org.uk with 'Book launch' in the subject line.
Fr Lanzetta's book is being published in English for the first time, by Gracewing. Its translation into English was sponsored by the Latin Mass Society.
Below is a written interview with Fr Lanzetta about his book.
Vatican II, a
pastoral Council
The Key-Problem of
its Hermeneutics
Interview with Fr.
Serafino M. Lanzetta about his latest work, “Vatican II: A Pastoral Council.
Hermeneutics of Council Teaching”, with a foreword by Rt. Rev. Philip Egan,
Gracewing 2016, 528 pp. (or. It. Il
Vaticano II, un concilio pastorale. Ermeneutica delle dottrine conciliari, Siena 2014). This Interview appeared
originally in French, for the Journal “Catholica” 125 (2014). The questions
have been formulated by the same Journal.
1.
Question: The
Second Vatican Council poses first and foremost an epistemological problem even
before a theological one, or rather to be precise, it poses a problem that, in
as much as it is theological, is also necessarily epistemological. Are we
talking about the interpretation or the understanding of its documents? The
very interpretation is, in fact, a problem, both in the modern perspective of
the constructivist interpretation and in the post-modern view of the
deconstructivist interpretation. The interpretation does not explain the
interpretation: in itself, it refers to a basic principle. More than being a
solution, every interpretation is itself a problem within a problem. In the
light of your studies, what do you think of this?
Answer: Hermeneutics,
namely the interpretation of a text, and in our case of a Magisterial text, is
never the solution to a problem but only the instrument with which to reach a
solution, making reference to a basic principal that precedes the
interpretation and the very development of the text. This principle is the
faith of the Church, namely the organic
development of her doctrine.
In
my opinion, the problem is twofold. We must first of all realise that there is
an interpretation problem of the texts of the Second Vatican Council. The texts
– as every text, for that matter – are the object of a twofold interpretation
depending on the method one adopts: that of “discontinuity and rupture”, or
that of “renewal in the continuity” as Pope Benedict XVI told us. In other
words, the choice of the hermeneutic approach depends on our concept of Church:
what is the Church? A permanent synodality that becomes aware of itself in
history through the extraordinary convocation of a council? Or a mystery that
precedes time and becomes incarnated in history to then later surpass it in
eternity? This means, from a theological point of view, to give to hermeneutics
which is born in an existentialist and post-metaphysical context, an objective
foundation in the mystery that one wants to study: in our case, a council in
relation to the Church. Otherwise, we run the risk of making the method a
solution, in a continuous and absorbing interpretation.
Having
ascertained the fundamental approach to the hermeneutic method, a typical theme
of modernity, one can also clarify another problem. It is not enough to clarify
the hermeneutic approach and choose that which is consonant with the theme, it
is necessary to go to the texts, the conciliar texts, by means of the
hermeneutical method. In other words, it is not enough to choose the
hermeneutic of “renewal in the continuity” in order to resolve the problem of
the texts of Vatican II (admitting that at the epistemological level it has
been recognised as such), but we must then apply it so as to allow the continuity
to be seen, to demonstrate it, or rather, just show it. If the method, the
approach, was the solution and not the point of departure, it would be enough
to state it and to overcome the problem. In reality, if we read carefully Benedict
XVI’s discourse to the Roman Curia (22 December 2005), we see how the Pontiff
after having stated the correct hermeneutical principal as opposed to the
erroneous one of rupture, goes on straight away to verify it in the example of
religious liberty. He reaffirms that principles do not change, whereas the
historical forms that bear those principles are in themselves subject to
change. Therefore, continuity in the principles, while mutability or
discontinuity in the historical forms. The problem, in Benedict XVI’s judgement,
is precisely the coordination of continuity and discontinuity, which both lend
themselves, even if on two different levels. Today, the situation of the
60s-70s of the last century in the West has already changed greatly. A great open-minded
and tolerant trust towards the exercise of religious liberty has been replaced
by a frightening relativist aggression, which should stimulate the theologian to
discern new possibilities for a correct exercise of religious liberty in the
external forum, concentrating one’s attention more on God’s truth than on the
mere possibility of choosing among the varied religious panorama. This however,
requires a separate discussion.
Let
us return to the problem of the method. We are talking about interpreting the
documents and reading them in the light of the Church’s faith, the true
key-criteria from which we must begin and the foundation to which every theological
interpretation must be led back. I was saying that it is not sufficient to
state the hermeneutical criteria that one adopts in order to have the solution.
This goes both for when one adopts an incorrect criteria like that of
fundamental discontinuity and rupture, as for when one adopts the correct
criteria of continuity. I will give an example to clarify this concept. Let us
take a doctrinal element contained in the decree on ecumenism, Unitatis redintegratio n.11: the
so-called “hierarchy of truths”. What does it mean? Formulated in this way, this
principle is rather new and typical of Vatican II. Certainly one must interpret
this proposition correctly, which in turn serves as a criteria of
interpretation of “Revelation”. Does this mean that there are truths
hierarchically subordinated because less revealed than others or less binding
than others because not so important? Certainly not, but it means that in the system
of revealed truths (defined or not defined by the Church), not all of them have
the same relationship with the basis of Revelation. For example: the Immaculate
Conception of Mary is connected to God’s Revelation through the truth of
original sin originated and of Christ’s Universal Redemption, but no one would
dare to say that it is less important or less revealed than the truth of
Universal Redemption. The hierarchy of truths must be read in view of the analogy
of truth and not as subordination of some truths to others, to the point of
being able to favour their momentary or permanent “pastoral freezing”.
Therefore, using the hermeneutical criteria of continuity of the Council with
all of the Church’s faith, analogia fidei
is the only way to read this “hierarchy of truths” correctly and not using, on
the contrary, as some theologians do, the precedence of praxis over theory –
that is the precedence of ecumenical dialogue over the one and unique truth of
the Church, claiming the unity of Christ’s disciples, invoked by the Lord
Himself, more impelling today than the unity of the Church constituted by
Christ. The hermeneutical principle can therefore constitute a problem. The
only way that it can be used correctly is for it to be guided by what the
Church has always believed and lived. In concise words, the only correct
principle of interpretation of Vatican II is the uninterrupted Tradition of the
Church, which also protects us from another risk: to resolve the whole of
Vatican II in a hermeneutical problem, through an adaptation more or less favourable
to modernity, which poses the problem of interpretation as the fundamental
problem, and forgetting rather, the true reason wherefore a council is convoked
within the Church. It is time, fifty years after the last ecumenical council,
to make room for the faith rather then a sole interpretation of Vatican II.
2.
Question:
From reading the documents of Vatican II, it clearly emerges that it is the
Council itself that poses the problem of the Council. It would be enough to refer
to the first note of the introduction to Gaudium et spes to realise it. The Council itself appears
needy of explanations: the case of the Nota explicativa praevia is emblematic. The conciliar texts
objectively highlight the questions opened by themselves. To remember this
simply means to take the documents seriously. To interdict discussion (on the
grounds of a misunderstood “respect”, which is implicitly equivalent to an
irrationalist conception of power) certainly does not contribute to clarifying
the matter. The prohibition to ask questions – as Eric Voegelin has reminded us
– is proper to (gnostic) ideologies. This differs from authentic theological
intelligence, which is in itself, open to face questions and discussions. In
your opinion, to what point are the analyses of the various problems open?
Answer: The
hermeneutical problem of the Second Vatican Council does not originate simply
after, during the receptive phase of the conciliar magisterium, but already in the
phases of the conciliar assizes. It is very surprising to see how the theme of the
Council’s pastorality, sometimes inflected as “aggiornamento” (a word never used in the papal discourses during
the Council, but by John XXIII in reference to the Code of Canon Law in his
speech for the convocation of the Roman Synod, and consequently of the new
Council) was to be a key for passing from the schemes that had been justly prepared
for the conciliar discussion, to the new schemes that arose from this
discussion, and above all, from the heated theological disputes of the experts.
For example, the prepared scheme De
fontibus Revelationis, in the opinion of many, should have been rejected as
such, because it was not very “pastoral” and furthermore, did not respond to
the intentions of John XXIII in his opening speech Gaudet mater ecclesia. This manner of proceeding was like the leitmotiv in the discussion. The
problem, however, was to establish what “pastoral” actually meant and if John
XXIII had really wanted to pose pastorality (understood per se already in a new way) against the manner of proceeding of
the previous Ecumenical Councils. This was the problem that was readdressed
from time to time by the orators in session, most of all, regarding the more
important schemes, such as that on the Church, which required an interpretation
of the mens of the Pope. This would
then require an interpretation of the mens
of the Council itself. In fact, the manner of interpreting “pastorality” in
relation to the opening speech, will orient the majority of the Council and
therefore the votes. One is therefore obliged to ask himself, for instance,
what “pastorality” means according to the mind of the Second Vatican Council.
I
do not follow the footsteps of C. Theobald in the French circle, of H. Sauer in
the German one, of G. Ruggieri in the Italian, who make of pastorality itself a
hermeneutical principle of Vatican II, reading the entire conciliar magisterium
by its light. I see pastorality rather as the problem to be resolved,
indicating that which I believe to be the only solution and that is, the
classic distinction between the dogmatic and pastoral. The pastoral draws its
reason for being from the dogma of faith and from the one, undivided Church (in
order to act, one must be), ever capable at the same time, to solicit new
analyses and clarifications by reason of future challenges. It cannot become
the hermeneutical motive for the conciliar movement towards a new Church,
towards a “softer doctrine” that adapts itself to various situations, for the
simple fact that pastorality is itself mutability linked to time and to
concrete situations, whereas the Faith, protected and announced by the Church,
precedes time, enlightening and redeeming it. This seems to me to be precisely
a very relevant and open question for theology: the capacity to re-write, in
view of the times, that ancient and harmonious binomial that sees doctrine in
view of the pastoral and the pastoral for the salvation of the peoples. After
all, what is necessary is to place faith and charity, reason and love, in their
correct and wise circular order.
A
historical and theological interest to deepen the understanding of how things
really went is growing, and this without a doubt, is praiseworthy. In recent
years, very useful studies have been produced on the hermeneutical theme of
Vatican II and above all, on a theme that comes before every possible
theological investigation: to clarify the distinction of the conciliar
magisterium according to the documental hierarchy. A dogmatic constitution is
not a decree or a declaration. It has been specified various times that the
pillars of the whole magisterium of Vatican II are the two dogmatic
constitutions: Lumen gentium on the
Church and Dei Verbum on Divine
Revelation, following which, Sacrosanctum
Concilium on the liturgy and the pastoral Gaudium et Spes. These four constitutions, as one can see, are
already different among themselves in regards to their doctrinal content. Gaudium et Spes cannot rise to a
doctrine stricto sensu or in toto, as on the contrary, Lumen gentium. Rather, it presupposes
some doctrinal principles: it is the word of the Church addressed to the world,
with the aim of showing the way in which She understands her presence in the then
contemporary panorama which has already changed today. This, as you mentioned, recalled
the first note to the text of the pastoral constitution, not without letting the
first difficulties transpire. It is already difficult to put together the two
words that distinguish the document: “constitution” and “pastoral”. The Council
is clearly adopting a new manner of teaching, which must necessarily be noted
for a corresponding hermeneutic. If one then observes the two dogmatic
constitutions, various levels of magisterium can be seen, even if one attests
to this data: the general tenor of the teaching is solemn/extraordinary or
supreme in respect to the subject who teaches (an ecumenical council) and
authentic, ordinary in respect to the subject taught, deducing this from its
re-proposition or initial proposition and from the way in which it is taught. In order to understand the Second
Vatican Council, one must frequently make distinctions and not put “all our eggs in one basket”.
Another
factor must also be considered in order to approach the documents in a correct manner:
it often occurs that a declaration or a decree reprises or deepens the study of
the themes taught in the constitutions. One can think, for example, of the
ecumenical theme and therefore, of the relation with the Church of Christ, the
Catholic Church, with the other Christian communities or churches examined in Unitatis redintegratio with respect to Lumen gentium. This tells us that also a
dogmatic constitution is not a closed and definitive text; its teachings can be
completed by another document of an inferior juridical nature and by a theme
developed elsewhere. Remember also the example of an inverse case, the theme of
permanent diaconate dealt with in Lumen
gentium and taken up again with a new but also problematic emphasis in the
decree on the missions Ad gentes
(where it speaks of “men who carry out the functions of the
deacon’s office”, n.16, “functions” which however do not exist
outside the sacrament). What does this say to us on a hermeneutical level?
Above all that we must be cautious in distinguishing between doctrines, the way
to teach them and the nature of the document that teaches them, bearing in mind
the aim of the Council that is almost always present: the pastorality of the
Council.
There
are also other themes that would deserve new attention from theology, that I
try to evidence in my work. In studying Vatican II in its conciliar phases, one
witnesses a rather singular fact. During the sessions of conciliar debates and
above all, in the Doctrinal Commission, some much more recent doctrines in
terms of theological study and magisterial development – for example, episcopal
collegiality, permanent married deacons,
sacramentality of the Church – were proposed with notable zeal by skilled theologians
to the Fathers, and were later taught; whereas other doctrines, much more
ancient in their dogmatic development, to which was often possible to add the
attribute of “common” – we can think of limbo, or the theme of creation and the
snare of evolutionism, or the members of the Church (how does one belong in a
perfect or full way to the Church?) in relation to the connection between the invisible
mystery or mystical Body of Christ and the visible and hierarchical society or the
social and historical body – were instead, set aside because considered not yet
mature and to be left to theological discussion. Some questions were therefore
excluded because considered disputed, whilst others not. It would be necessary
to re-address the status quaestionis
of many doctrines abandoned at the vigil of Vatican II and to re-propose their
relevance to the present day. They could help us, above all, to resolve a great
superficiality that often seems to prevail over the speculation and systematic
reflection on the fonts of theological knowledge.
To
pose questions is the proprium of
every science, so also theology, which is the science of the Faith. It must be
capable of raising questions, certainly not in order to embrace the Cartesian
method which desires to demonstrate the faith by questioning it, but to
clarify, as far as possible, the reason for its assumptions and to favour the
development of the intellectus fidei:
to read the faith from within, entering into it, so to say. What is important,
however, is not to ask questions but to ask the right questions. This is
precisely what I hope to do in my latest work, where I try to pose those
questions which, in my opinion, are still to be answered, but which hold
special importance for the object of our study.
3.
Question:
As is known, since its indiction, Vatican II was willed as pastoral (therefore,
neither dogmatic nor disciplinary). A method and a praxis are manifested in
order to precede and dispose the documents themselves. Thus a method is
established and the content to be identified. Or analogously, the praxeological
attitude is the premise, and the teaching is to be carried out as a
consequence. Precisely for this reason, the primate of pastorality emerges (in
the intentions, formulation, language). In this sense, pastorality itself
undeniably opens a problem rather than contain a solution. Studying Vatican II
in your latest book, you make use of the category of “pastoral epiphany”. What
reflections do you propose in this regard?
Answer: As I said before, it is my opinion that pastorality
is the problem to be resolved in the Council. Not
in the sense that it is a problem in itself, but rather, because we do not have
a definition of pastorality according to the mind of the Council. One simply
retakes its classical meaning and definition in theology, or it is read
according to the minds of some influential conciliar theologians, ending up with
assuming more than one role or often going beyond its ambit. In the name of
pastorality, discussions were cut short, by it, the agenda of the Council’s
extraordinary magisterium was often planned and doctrine proposed, even if, like
I said, their theological age was extremely young, and should rather have been
left to further debate notwithstanding its long course. There is also another
surprising factor: pastorality is also often inflected as an ecumenical effort
of the Council, but this almost always means a one-way ecumenism with
Protestants. And what about the Orthodox of the East? Some Fathers complained
about this, seeing in this pastoral choice more a wound to unity than a new
encouragement. For example, why was there an extremely long disquisition on the
Traditio constitutiva of the Church,
which had lasted over years, with the aim of toning it down, when it was the
central and vital theme of Orthodoxy (above all in the liturgical ambit)?
Furthermore,
I consider that the key problem is this: one cannot make of the object of
study, that is, of understanding the new significance of the conciliar
pastorality, the same hermeneutical method with which one approaches the
problem. I reiterate: the problem cannot become the method as occurs in many
hermeneutics. I would like to give a concrete example in order to show the
different way in which the Council Fathers, and even before them, the
theologians, debated in the name of pastorality, which was to be indicated by
John XXIII as the new position of the entire magisterial structure. For this
purpose, I present the definition of the word “pastoral” given by a conciliar
Father and a theological expert of the Council’s Doctrinal Commission.
The
General Master of the Dominicans, one of the Conciliar Fathers, Fr. A.
Fernandez presents this definition of “pastoral” in one of his oral
interventions during the Conciliar session as thus:
“1.
The word “pastoral” is an adjective. It cannot be understood nor explained if
not with regard to the substantive. The substantive admits a double case, and
one must not mistake one for the other; a) either means the substantive that is
the pasture or food; b) or otherwise the substantive that is the method of
administering food and pasture. 2. Therefore, the pastoral munus of the Council refers principally to the substantive that is
the food or the pasture. In fact, the Council defends the truth, it proposes
the truth. The truth is clear, perspicuous, it is what one would expect of it.
The pastoral munus of each one of us
refers principally to the substantive that is the method. The conciliar
doctrine belongs to the pastors, wholesome food to administer to all, attentive
to the conditions of places, times and people. A simple way to the simple, a learned
manner to the learned. […] We must not seek a pastoral nature that is obtained
to the detriment of the truth. Wherefore, if out of two formulas, one more
pastoral but less clear and exact, and another less pastoral but clearer and
more exact, without a doubt, the second is to be preferred in council. In
pastoral praxis the first is chosen; […]” (in Acta Synodalia [=AS] I/3, p.237).
Against
this idea of pastorality in line with the constant vision of theology and
magisterium, was the more theologically personal interpretation of E.
Schillebeeckx, which was no less influential as can be seen from the
discussions in Doctrinal Commission. He writes:
“The
pastoral council becomes doctrinal, precisely on account of its
pastoral character. “Pastoral” calls for doctrinal
deepening” (The Council notes of
Edward Schillebeeckx 1962-1963, Peters, Leuven 2011, p. 37). Here the
Council’s pastorality clearly, rather than being food with which to nourish the
faithful with the truth, becomes a “strategy” which makes the same doctrine
blossom. Of course, not all the theologians shared in this vision, but the more
influential and renowned did.
This
is why it is not easy to identify straight away and with absolute certainty
what pastorality means in Vatican II. For this reason I chose the word “epiphania” (manifestation, apparition)
to objectify where, from my point of view, this easy composition of doctrine
and pastoral is manifested – that doctrine gradually formed for a pastoral
motive, not for the presentation of a doctrine as such, but for a presentation to
be made in a certain way, bearing in mind certain external requests, among
which in a prevailing manner, the ecumenical afflatus. Following the
distinction of Fr Fernandez, the Council already carries out the work of the
pastor, that work of “translation” which would then have been assigned to
bishops and priests with all-pastoral prudence and solicitude. I speak of “pastoral epiphanies” therefore, because
I try to show precisely how the “principally pastoral aim” of the Council, as
one deduces more than once from the official replies either from the Secretary
of the Council or from the Council’s Doctrinal Commission (cf. AS II/6, 205; AS
III/8, p.10), presides in a certain way over the magisterial development of
Vatican II and therefore limits, besides the teaching itself, also the way of
presenting a doctrine, doing it in such a way that Vatican II normally
consolidates itself on the ordinary authentic magisterium. Vatican II was free
to do so, but councils were normally convoked not to begin teaching doctrines,
but to settle errors, to define truths of the Faith, or to teach them in a
definitive and hence unreformable way. Here, for example,
lies the difference between Vatican I and Vatican II. It is necessary to
realise this difference, bearing in mind that it reveals itself precisely in
this new fusion of pastorality and doctrinality. With my interpretation
however, I intend to protect Vatican II from an excessive enthusiasm, which
could end up generating a new re-interpretation precisely due to the “pastoral epiphanies”, finally concluding
that for the first time, we truly find ourselves before a pastoral council! In fact,
whilst I examine these epiphanies with the aim of applying a realistic
hermeneutic, I keep to the traditional distinction between pastoral and
dogmatic, seeing them as one being the reason of the other, but subordinating
the praxis to faith and dogma.
I carry out an examination of the
Council’s epiphanic pastorality fundamentally in three areas of the conciliar
doctrines: 1) in the intentions and formation of the doctrine regarding the
relationship Scripture-Tradition in Dei
Verbum; 2) in the intentions and formation of the doctrine on the Church in
Lumen gentium; 3) in the intentions
of the Fathers and, therefore, in the formation of the Mariological doctrine in
the VIII Chapter of Lumen gentium. The
formation of the Marian chapter of the constitution on the Church is truly an
emblem of a Council in fieri,
fundamentally divided on the interpretation of the pastoral and ecumenical
significance that is to be given to its teaching. Our Lady and the conciliar
Mariology, though very rich and abundant, is however, also a reflection of a
problem which already arose in the Council when, simply for a disparity of 40
votes, the Marian scheme was incorporated into that on the Church, with
everything that this incorporation could and had to mean. What counts on the
magisterial level is the doctrine taught in the final document, but its correct
hermeneutic
would be impossible without taking into account its formation and the mens that animated the Fathers. Vatican
II is certainly a new council from various points of view, but not up to the
point of having to transform the Church itself into a new council, which is
capable of raising enthusiasm from time to time and according to the various
stages of history.
4. Questions: In your work on Vatican II, after
having dealt extensively with the problem of the conciliar teaching as an act
of magisterium, you focus on the question of the Council’s position regarding
the theological qualification of its very doctrines. The theories of those who
made of it a “superdogma” (to use the expression of the then Cardinal
Ratzinger), or in other words, the beginning of a “new Christianity” before
which anything “pre-conciliar” is to be rejected, have emerged in these
post-conciliar years. In this sense, coherently, they are surpassed by the
theorists of the “spirit of the Council”, for whom Vatican II must go beyond
itself: it is prolonged in the praxis that surpasses the “spirit”, to the point
of exhausting (and emptying) it in this movement. Likewise, there are those who
(they would say with a “conservatory” attitude) have “dogmatised” all the
conciliar texts, making themselves their jealous propagators and aggressive
custodians, but are paradoxically proved wrong by the very same conciliar
texts. Could you indicate what are your theological conclusions in this regard?
Answer: It
is particularly disconcerting to see how the Second Vatican Council has been “bent”,
not without deliberate coercions, to the most varied interpretations that are all
fundamentally ascribable to an over-estimation of the last council, with
respect not only to all the other previous ones, but also to the Church’s
history and the very mystery of the Church. Of course, if we start from the
idea that between the first and the third Christian millennium there is a historical
and conciliar gap – as the so-called “Bologna School” does – then Vatican II
certainly serves to fill this void that was suddenly created. Undoubtedly, not
all the councils were dogmatic like Trent and Vatican I, but certainly no
council was pastorally dogmatic or dogmatically pastoral as Vatican II is made
to become from time to time, both when it is made to rise as a new beginning
and the North Star of the solemn and supreme magisterium of the Church, as well
as when, in order to protect its new doctrines, they are “infallibilised” without
realising that the Council itself does not desire this. What we ask ourselves
however, is the “why” of such a tenacity on Vatican II. Maybe because it was
supposed to represent the banner for a certain Catholicism which was very
quickly auto-defined post-conciliar? A new “style” of being the Church and
Christians? They do not realise that precisely this effort is to the detriment
of the Council itself, reducing it to a dam, to a “superdogma” that in fact
relativizes faith and morals.
Following the historical development of the idea of the council and its form (see the first chapter of my book), it is interesting to learn that it is not the juridical concept of “representation” (a council represents the Church) that defines a council in the strict sense – the conciliarists of the XIV century had mastered this concept in order to subordinate the Pope to the council – but rather the need, that was already felt at the first ecumenical council of Nicea, to defend the faith and to teach the truth: the greatest spiritual gift. The issue of a council has never been its infallibility, but the necessity to teach the truth.
Also those who see Vatican II as a break from Tradition, in my humble opinion, over-estimates the Council, dogmatising and infallibilising each of its doctrines, even those that are more dispositions or pastoral teachings relative to times, which were judged as new. If, in the judgement of some theologians, a solid biblical foundation is missing in order to establish, in the external forum, religious liberty as a foundation of a Christian State, from which “tolerance” towards the exercise of other religious cult is derived, how much more unsteady will such a biblical foundation be when one places all religions, because such, on the same level with regard to the exercise of cult in civil society, leaving to the laity the responsibility of announcing the Gospel to all? Does the State no longer have any obligation towards God and the religio vera? I refer, to the example of positive religious liberty (exercised in the external forum) because it is one of the most debated subjects, whereas negative religious liberty remains biblically and traditionally clear (no matter of faith can be forced on someone’s conscience). This is one of the topics, perhaps the most heated, that requires like others, greater elasticity. It is necessary for Vatican II to be both read and interpreted for what it is, according to its mens, and not according to a personal (political) inclination towards the ecclesiastical right or left-wing, or a subjective sensitivity towards the conservative or progressive. Already in 1968 Dietrich von Hildebrand proved that a mere contraposition between conservatism and progressivism is simply sterile: the point is either truth or prevarication, the truth or a “spiritual house of cards”.
For this purpose, based on other studies that have been published along the same line, it has been my desire to interrogate the Council as such. I have sought to re-discover – as far as it has been granted to me and save for a better judgement – the mens of the Vatican on certain key doctrines. The theologian is interested in understanding above all, so as to move with surety, the grade of magisterial teaching of the doctrines that we have before us. Precisely because this is not always clear, it is necessary to have recourse to a systematic study of the Council’s sources. The grade of magisterial teaching to which corresponds a theological note and on the other hand, a theological censure – I re-engage the topic of notes and censures that are so indispensable to the theological discussion –, with which to indicate a doctrine, allows us to examine the conciliar doctrines in a sure way; and there, where one finds the need because dealing with doctrines not yet definitively taught, to also be able to indicate some suggestions for an organic dogmatic progress, realised in any case by the Church’s magisterium. Upon examining these doctrines, which are among the most important and significant in the whole magisterial structure: Scripture-Tradition, members of the Church/belonging to the Church, episcopal collegiality, the mystery of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Christ and in the Church, I have reached the conclusion that we find ourselves before truths to which could be attributed the following theological note: “sententiae ad fidem pertinentes”, that is doctrines “upon which magisterium has not yet pronounced itself definitively, whose negation could lead to placing other truths of the faith in danger and whose truth is guaranteed by their intimate connection with revelation” (see pp. 423-432 of my book). A subsequent dogmatic development would still be possible for these doctrines, to reach the grade “definitive tenenda” and higher still, to their proclamation as dogma of faith. For a fair number of theologians in Council, only the question of the “sacramentality of the episcopate” is a definitive doctrine. Also on this point, however, there is no unanimity.
The verification of the so-called “mens Sanctae Synodus” could be seen by some as a light-hearted or even dangerous exercise, since it is up to the Magisterium to justify itself. Such a cutting off however, would abolish the very being of theology and contradict the repeated invites of the Council’s General Secretariat to read the proposed doctrines from the conciliar magisterium (not dogmatically defined nor held definitively, which would not require any interpretation because self-explanatory and would therefore be clear) with the spirit of the Council itself, a spirit that can be deduced from the subject dealt with and from the manner of expression, in accordance with the norms of theological interpretation.
The distinctiveness of my work consists in the fact that, with the aim of faithfully interpreting these doctrines of the Council, I avail myself of numerous first-hand sources. The numerous expert reports of theologians of the Doctrinal Commission were of great importance to my work, and which in the hierarchy of fonts, are to be placed at a much higher level than personal diaries, following straight after the Synodal Acts. They constitute the most authentic testimonies of what the theological mind of the Council prepared for the discussions, modifying or improving them based on the Council discussions, accepting or not the so-called modi presented by the Fathers. It is not hard to find the theological theses of various experts of the majority positions within the Commission. To follow the discussion of the Doctrinal Commission step-by-step is of great epistemic help in order to correctly evaluate the discussions of the Fathers in session. The Fathers frequently depended on their theologians, but their theology did not always depend on the Church’s Tradition. This is also a factor that one must bear in mind, and that can settle, so I think, many discussions that are still open regarding the correct hermeneutics of the Second Vatican Council.
Following the historical development of the idea of the council and its form (see the first chapter of my book), it is interesting to learn that it is not the juridical concept of “representation” (a council represents the Church) that defines a council in the strict sense – the conciliarists of the XIV century had mastered this concept in order to subordinate the Pope to the council – but rather the need, that was already felt at the first ecumenical council of Nicea, to defend the faith and to teach the truth: the greatest spiritual gift. The issue of a council has never been its infallibility, but the necessity to teach the truth.
Also those who see Vatican II as a break from Tradition, in my humble opinion, over-estimates the Council, dogmatising and infallibilising each of its doctrines, even those that are more dispositions or pastoral teachings relative to times, which were judged as new. If, in the judgement of some theologians, a solid biblical foundation is missing in order to establish, in the external forum, religious liberty as a foundation of a Christian State, from which “tolerance” towards the exercise of other religious cult is derived, how much more unsteady will such a biblical foundation be when one places all religions, because such, on the same level with regard to the exercise of cult in civil society, leaving to the laity the responsibility of announcing the Gospel to all? Does the State no longer have any obligation towards God and the religio vera? I refer, to the example of positive religious liberty (exercised in the external forum) because it is one of the most debated subjects, whereas negative religious liberty remains biblically and traditionally clear (no matter of faith can be forced on someone’s conscience). This is one of the topics, perhaps the most heated, that requires like others, greater elasticity. It is necessary for Vatican II to be both read and interpreted for what it is, according to its mens, and not according to a personal (political) inclination towards the ecclesiastical right or left-wing, or a subjective sensitivity towards the conservative or progressive. Already in 1968 Dietrich von Hildebrand proved that a mere contraposition between conservatism and progressivism is simply sterile: the point is either truth or prevarication, the truth or a “spiritual house of cards”.
For this purpose, based on other studies that have been published along the same line, it has been my desire to interrogate the Council as such. I have sought to re-discover – as far as it has been granted to me and save for a better judgement – the mens of the Vatican on certain key doctrines. The theologian is interested in understanding above all, so as to move with surety, the grade of magisterial teaching of the doctrines that we have before us. Precisely because this is not always clear, it is necessary to have recourse to a systematic study of the Council’s sources. The grade of magisterial teaching to which corresponds a theological note and on the other hand, a theological censure – I re-engage the topic of notes and censures that are so indispensable to the theological discussion –, with which to indicate a doctrine, allows us to examine the conciliar doctrines in a sure way; and there, where one finds the need because dealing with doctrines not yet definitively taught, to also be able to indicate some suggestions for an organic dogmatic progress, realised in any case by the Church’s magisterium. Upon examining these doctrines, which are among the most important and significant in the whole magisterial structure: Scripture-Tradition, members of the Church/belonging to the Church, episcopal collegiality, the mystery of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Christ and in the Church, I have reached the conclusion that we find ourselves before truths to which could be attributed the following theological note: “sententiae ad fidem pertinentes”, that is doctrines “upon which magisterium has not yet pronounced itself definitively, whose negation could lead to placing other truths of the faith in danger and whose truth is guaranteed by their intimate connection with revelation” (see pp. 423-432 of my book). A subsequent dogmatic development would still be possible for these doctrines, to reach the grade “definitive tenenda” and higher still, to their proclamation as dogma of faith. For a fair number of theologians in Council, only the question of the “sacramentality of the episcopate” is a definitive doctrine. Also on this point, however, there is no unanimity.
The verification of the so-called “mens Sanctae Synodus” could be seen by some as a light-hearted or even dangerous exercise, since it is up to the Magisterium to justify itself. Such a cutting off however, would abolish the very being of theology and contradict the repeated invites of the Council’s General Secretariat to read the proposed doctrines from the conciliar magisterium (not dogmatically defined nor held definitively, which would not require any interpretation because self-explanatory and would therefore be clear) with the spirit of the Council itself, a spirit that can be deduced from the subject dealt with and from the manner of expression, in accordance with the norms of theological interpretation.
The distinctiveness of my work consists in the fact that, with the aim of faithfully interpreting these doctrines of the Council, I avail myself of numerous first-hand sources. The numerous expert reports of theologians of the Doctrinal Commission were of great importance to my work, and which in the hierarchy of fonts, are to be placed at a much higher level than personal diaries, following straight after the Synodal Acts. They constitute the most authentic testimonies of what the theological mind of the Council prepared for the discussions, modifying or improving them based on the Council discussions, accepting or not the so-called modi presented by the Fathers. It is not hard to find the theological theses of various experts of the majority positions within the Commission. To follow the discussion of the Doctrinal Commission step-by-step is of great epistemic help in order to correctly evaluate the discussions of the Fathers in session. The Fathers frequently depended on their theologians, but their theology did not always depend on the Church’s Tradition. This is also a factor that one must bear in mind, and that can settle, so I think, many discussions that are still open regarding the correct hermeneutics of the Second Vatican Council.
Serafino M. Lanzetta
Support the work of the LMS by becoming an 'Anniversary Supporter'.
It says much for the enduring importance of Vatican II that its opponents still think they have to rubbish it with this kind of pompous and long-winded pseudery.
ReplyDeleteThe rhetoric of the hermeneutic of continuity is really quite dishonest. In practice everybody thinks that we should be in continuity with the particular set of traditions that I like and prefer, but these were once innovations, changes, breaks in continuity. It is not that continuity is ipso facto good and rupture bad, it is rather that we all prefer some changes to others. We should be honest in saying so.